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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace will become a main front in both irregular and traditional conflicts. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states
and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur
to highly trained professional hackers. Through cyberspace, enemies will target industry, academia, government, as well as the
military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains. In much
the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World
War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield
a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication. 1
One of the most prominent features of the global political system
. . . is the significant surge in numbers and importance of nonstate entities. . . . The rise of these . . . non-state actors and their
growing involvement in world politics challenges the assumptions of traditional approaches to international relations which
assume that states are the only important units of the international system.2

Within the past fifteen to twenty years, the international
community has witnessed the rise of a new style of warfare.
Attacks are no longer limited to soldiers firing their weapons at
clearly defined targets on the ground, nor are they limited to
traditional forms of air and naval operations. Today, through
cyberspace, enemies can target government agencies, industries, and domestic infrastructure from thousands of miles
away. This new form of warfare turns a state’s and non-state’s
own technology against it in order to bring down vital infrastructure.3 These “cyber attacks” have the potential to cause
mass physical and economic destruction. Their ability to be
carried out anonymously, coupled with the low cost and wide
availability of computers, are making cyber attacks an attractive method of warfare.4
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the
1 U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND, THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 36
(2010) (emphasis added).
2 Gustaaf Geeraets, Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics, 1 POLE
PAPERS, NO. 4 (1996), available at http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/pole-papers/
pole0104.htm.
3 See Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International
Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 304 (2010).
4 See id.
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number of cyber attacks, both by nations and non-state actors.5
However, currently, there are no provisions in the international laws of war that explicitly outlaw or even regulate cyber
warfare.6 Furthermore, given the rise of the non-state actor’s
importance and influence in the international community,7 it is
quite odd/troubling that these international laws of war only
apply to state actors.8
This article argues that existing international laws of war
are inadequate and need to be adjusted and clearly defined to
include cyber attacks involving state and non-state actors.
Part II of this article describes the different forms and increasing use of cyber attacks in international conflicts. Part III focuses on the importance and relevance of non-state actors in
the international community and today’s asymmetric battlefield. Part IV discusses the applicability of current international laws of war to cyber attacks. Part V of this article suggests ways in which current international law can be improved
to include and regulate cyber attacks involving state and nonstate actors.
II. CYBER ATTACKS AND THEIR INCREASING USE IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
A. What is a Cyber Attack?
Definitions of cyber attacks vary, and the range of hostile
activities that constitute cyber attacks are spread across a very
wide spectrum.9 According to the U.S. Army’s Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism Handbook, a cyber attack is:
The premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat thereSwanson, supra note 3.
Id. at 305.
7 See Geeraets, supra note 2.
8 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (only applying the prohibition of the
use or threat of force to state actors); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (only applying Geneva Law to
“high contracting parties”) [hereinafter Geneva Convention for the Wounded
and Sick].
9 Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011).
5
6
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of, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to
cause harm or to further social, ideological, religious, political or
similar objectives. Or to intimidate any person in furtherance of
such objectives.10

More generally, Matthew Waxman defines cyber attacks as “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or networks
or the information or programs on them.”11 Harm from these
attacks can be inflicted either on a computer network, or physical facilities and persons. Cyber attacks range from “malicious
hacking and defacement of websites to large-scale destruction
of the military or civilian infrastructures that rely on those
networks.”12
Cyber attacks are thus distinguishable from what domestic
law enforcement has deemed “cyber crimes.” Cyber crimes, like
fraud or posting obscene and offensive content on the Internet,
are governed by national criminal laws.13 The intentions of
those that commit cyber crimes are also very different from
those who initiate cyber attacks.14
Cyber attacks are initiated in what is called “cyberspace.”
Today, the most common definition for cyberspace refers to the
internet, and usually consists of some sort of informationsharing environment between computers.15 In the United
States, the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations defines cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the use
of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated

10 U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, DCSINT HANDBOOK NO.
1.02, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM, at VII-2 (2006).
11 Waxman, supra note 9, at 422.
12 Id.
13 See Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyber Space: The Inevitable New
Military Branch – The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293 (2008).
14 See id. at 301 (explaining that those who commit cyber crimes exhibit
personal desires like stealing money whereas a cyber attack’s purpose can be
to take out a military target).
15 See Michael A. Sinks, Cyber Warfare and International Law 3 (Apr.
2008) (unpublished research paper) (on file with Air University, Air Command and Staff College), available at https://www.afresearch.org/skins
/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153&mode=user&action=researchproject&objectid=1120f215-38a94829-bb7a-33de2e42ec12.
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physical infrastructure.”16 Furthermore, “joint doctrine has
adopted a computer-centric definition where cyberspace is the
‘notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over networks.’”17 In essence, “cyberspace is the
sum of electronic networks including, but not limited to, the Internet, where various information operations occur.”18
B. Types of Cyber Attacks
Cyber attacks can take many shapes and forms. This article will focus on attacks that are used quite frequently in cyberspace: viruses, denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks, worms, and Trojan horses.
1. Viruses
A virus (quite possibly the “simplest” type of cyber attack
according to Jason Barkham) is a code fragment, intentionally
written and launched, that attaches itself to a program, and
only operates when the host program begins to run.19 A virus’s
“most common trait is its ability to (1) attach itself to a host
program and execute when the host is operated and (2) replicate itself.”20 The intended goal of the virus is “to impact the
data or integrity of the computer without the owner’s
knowledge.”21 A well-executed and written virus has the potential to inflict serious damage. For example, “the ‘I Love You’
virus, released in the spring of 2000, caused an estimated $6.7
billion in damage.”22
2. Denial of Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Attacks
In a DoS attack, an attacker, hacker, etc. seeks to prevent
Id.
Id.
18 Swanson, supra note 3, at 307.
19 Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the
Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 62-63 (2001).
20 Sharon R. Stevens, Internet War Crimes Tribunals and Security in an
Interconnected World, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 657, 663 (2009).
21 Id.
22 Barkham, supra note 19, at 62-63.
16
17
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legitimate users from accessing information or services.23 An
attacker will either target a computer and its network connection, or the computers and networks of sites, in order to prevent the user from accessing email, websites, online accounts,
or any other service that relies on the affected computer.24
“The most common and obvious type of DoS attack occurs when
an attacker ‘floods’ a network with information.”25 For example, an individual may seek to cripple a website or a computer
network by sending it an overwhelming amount of data requests.26 Since the server can only process a certain amount of
requests at a time, when an attacker sends an exorbitant
amount of data requests, the server will be unable to respond
to legitimate data requests, thus disallowing access to the
site.27
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, on the other
hand, use many computers that “are pre-infected with a virus
that hijacks another computer to attack Web sites, making it
exponentially more powerful than a standard DoS attack.”28
For instance, an attacker may take control of another computer
or system, and then force the infected computer to send large
amounts of data to a website. The attack is “distributed” because the attacker is using multiple computers to launch the
denial of service attack.29
3. Worms
A worm is an independent program that, once infected on
one computer, copies itself onto other machines, but usually
does not change the makeup of other programs.30 “Worms can
cause damage merely by eating up network resources or by de-

23 Mindi McDowell, National Cyber Alert System, US-CERT.GOV (Nov. 4,
2009), http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber Attacks, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 262 (2009).
27 McDowell, supra note 23.
28 McGavran, supra note 26, at 262.
29 McDowell, supra note 23.
30 Barkham, supra note 19, at 63.
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stroying data, and are particularly effective over networks.”31
And, unlike a computer virus, the worm does not need to attach
itself to an existing program.
The first Internet worm was unleashed upon the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s computer network on November 2, 1988, from a twenty-three year-old Cornell University graduate student’s computer terminal in Ithaca, New York.32
After infecting a single computer, the worm copied itself to other machines, and in the span of one day, infected an estimated
five to ten percent of all Internet-connected machines at MIT.33
4. Trojan Horses
Derived from the “Trojan Horse” story in Greek mythology,
Trojan horses are one of the easiest weapons that hackers can
use to “wreak havoc on the internet.”34 A Trojan horse is a destructive tool that operates under the guise of a valuable or
otherwise entertaining computer program.35 They can be viruses or remote control programs that provide complete access
to a victim’s computer, and can be installed on a host computer
in a number of ways, including, for instance, through an email
attachment intended to be opened by the victim.36 As the user
enjoys or uses the email attachment, infection occurs simultaneously and silently.37 In essence, a Trojan horse either replaces a legitimate program, or simulates a legitimate program.38
When a user runs a Trojan horse, it executes detrimental
commands that are unknown to the user.39 “For example, a
Trojan horse hidden in a random program downloaded from the
Internet may read any file on a user’s system, and then e-mail
Id.
JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP
IT 37 (2008).
33 Id.
34 John Crapanzano, Deconstructing SubSeven, the Trojan Horse of
Choice,
SANS
INSTITUTE
(2003),
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/
whitepapers/malicious/deconstructing-subseven-trojan-horse-choice_953.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Kristen M. Koepsel, Methods and Tools for Cyber Attacks – Trojan
Horse, in DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 1.44 (2011).
39 Id.
31
32
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it anywhere in the world.”40 Furthermore, “if a remote control
Trojan [horse] is installed and initiated on a system, that computer is now completely open to anyone who knows to connect
to it using the Trojan horse as a server.”41 A remote control
Trojan horse differs from a traditional computer virus in that it
does not spread throughout an infected system; it is thus a contained program designed to invisibly execute commands issued
by a remote user.42
C. Recent Cyber Attacks Used in International Conflicts
Cyber attacks are not a new phenomenon in the international community. In 1996, a congressional report given by the
General Accounting Office of the United States projected that
the Department of Defense may have experienced as many as
250,000 cyber attacks during that year, and further estimated
that the attacks were successful 65% of the time.43 The report
also found that only about one in 150 attacks were actually detected and reported.44 These cyber attacks have evolved exponentially, from small hacker attacks against government computers to large-scale distributed denial of service attacks that
can ultimately disrupt a single nation’s infrastructure, bringing
it to its knees.
1. Cyber Attacks on the Estonian Infrastructure
On April 27, 2007, a massive series of cyber attacks crippled main components of Estonia’s essential electronic infrastructure. The attacks were allegedly initiated when Estonian
officials moved a statue commemorating Russians who perished while driving the Nazis out of the country at the end of
World War II.45 In only a few hours, the online portals of Estonia’s leading banks were flooded with data requests and
crashed. All of the principal newspaper websites stopped workId.
Crapanzano, supra note 34.
42 Id.
43 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT. OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-84, COMPUTER ATTACKS
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS 2 (1996).
44 Id. at 3.
45 Id.
40
41

AT
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ing, affecting circulation, and government communications
were largely blacked out.46 Throughout this onslaught, dozens
of targets were assaulted across the country.47 Because of Estonia’s wired “e-government,” its infrastructure was an enormous target for cyber attackers. In the end, government websites, newspapers, universities, hospitals, banks, and fire and
paramedic services were all victims of the attacks orchestrated
by allegedly one million computers operated by third parties
working together to bring down the Estonian government.48
These cyber attacks ultimately lasted for weeks.49 They
caused social unrest and rioting, resulting in property damage,
150 people injured, and one Russian dead.50 The Estonia incident displayed the full potential of well-executed cyber attacks.
It was the first time cyber attacks threatened the security of an
entire nation.51 To this day, it remains unknown whether state
or non-state actors were responsible for this offense.52
2. The Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict
When war broke out between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 over the disputed territory of South Ossetia, Russian
bombers sought to destroy Georgia’s economic infrastructure.
Targets included the country’s largest port on the Black Sea
and an important road connecting southern Georgia with the
East.53 As well, in the two months prior to the physical conflict,
Georgia’s “Internet Infrastructure” was hit with massive DDoS
attacks:
[M]ajor Georgian website servers were brought down, hindering communication and causing confusion throughout the country. . . . These
cyber attacks mainly hindered the Georgian government’s ability to
communicate with its citizens, as well as other nations, both before and
during the physical invasion by Russia.54
46 Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193 (2009).
47 Id.
48 Stevens, supra note 20, at 666.
49 Id.
50 Shackelford, supra note 46, at 193.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 205.
53 Swanson, supra note 3, at 303.
54 Id.
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Media, communications, and transportation companies were
also attacked, along with the National Bank of Georgia’s website.55 The attacks further spread to computers throughout the
government, even after Russian troops entered South Ossetia.56
What is important to note about this attack is that it was the
first time a known cyber attack had coincided with traditional
military action.57
3. Stuxnet
“Stuxnet is the world’s first cyber-weapon of geopolitical
significance; it enables a military attack using a computer program tailored to a specific target.”58 First discovered in 2010,
Stuxnet was a computer worm that infiltrated Siemens’s (a
German engineering company) industrial software and equipment, spreading via Microsoft Windows.59 Initiated via a removable memory stick, Stuxnet was the first worm to exploit a
Microsoft Windows vulnerability in order to spread:
Stuxnet was the first piece of malware to exploit the Microsoft Windows
Shortcut 'LNK/PIF' Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability (BID 41732) in
order to spread. The worm drops a copy of itself as well as a link to that
copy on a removable drive. When a removable drive is attached to a system and browsed with an application that can display icons, such as
Windows Explorer, the link file runs the copy of the worm. Due to a design flaw in Windows, applications that can display icons can also inadvertently run code, and in Stuxnet’s case, code in the .lnk file points to a
copy of the worm on the same removable drive.60

“It then sent detailed production information through the In-

55 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=1&th
=&adxnnl=1&oref=%20slogin&emc=th&adxnnlx=1218651509sGZ4ZcPX+1J8
D844weNClw.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Holger Stark, Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyberwar, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 08, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnet-virus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a778912.html.
59 Building a Cyber Secure Plant, SIEMENS TOTALLY INTEGRATED
AUTOMATION (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.totallyintegratedautomation.com/
2010/09/building-a-cyber-secure-plant/.
60 Jarrad Shearer, W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC.COM (JUL. 13, 2010),
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-0714003123-99.
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ternet to a set of servers in Malaysia.”61 Stuxnet was thus able
to provide cyber attackers with the valuable ability to remotely
control the infection process, and to hide the existence of their
changes to a system.62 Furthermore, the worm was not designed to instantly cause damage or inconvenience, but to inflict destruction over a substantial period of time.63 “As long as
the worm remained undetected, the attackers could steal information, halt production, compromise safety systems or even
cause equipment to be damaged or people injured whenever
they choose.”64
Along with other countries around the world, the worm repeatedly targeted five industrial facilities in Iran over a tenmonth period.65 On November 23, 2010, it was announced that
uranium enrichment at the Natanz nuclear facility had ceased
on several occasions because of a series of severe technical
problems caused by the Stuxnet worm.66 The worm first infected an Iranian IR-1 centrifuge, causing it to increase its operating speed for about fifteen minutes before returning to its normal frequency.67 Almost one month later, the worm went back
into action, further slowing the infected centrifuges for a total
of fifty minutes.68 The stresses from the shift in speeds caused
the aluminum centrifugal tubes to expand, often forcing parts
of the centrifuges into sufficient contact with each other, destroying the machine.69 Even though destruction of the centrifuges was by no means total, Stuxnet displayed to the world
the ever-growing destructive capabilities of cyber worms. According to General Michael Hayden, former Director of the
CIA, “Stuxnet is the first time where we’ve seen significant
Building a Cyber Secure Plant, supra note 59.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Virus Targets and Spread Revealed, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011, 8:51 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology12465688.
66 Yossi Melman, Iran Pauses Uranium Enrichment at Natanz Nuclear
Plant, HAARETZ.COM (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news
/international/iran-pauses-uranium-enrichment-at-natanz-nuclear-plant1.326276.
67 Stark, supra note 58.
68 Id.
69 Id.
61
62
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physical damage created by a cyber attack.”70
4. Alleged Government Cyber Attacks on WikiLeaks
Hosted on various servers across the globe, the whistleblowing organization WikiLeaks is no stranger to cyber attacks. The organization’s founder, Julian Assange, claims that
WikiLeak’s servers and computers are attacked in cyberspace
on a daily basis.71 What is particularly interesting about the
WikiLeaks cyber attacks is the alleged involvement of government institutions.
In 2010, WikiLeaks distributed, or “leaked,” United States
diplomatic cables to The New York Times, revealing that China’s Politburo directed the cyber intrusion of Google’s computer
systems in China.72 This situation came to be known as “CableGate.” The Google cyber attack “was part of a coordinated
campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government operatives, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government.”73 According to Julian Assange,
after the cables detailing the Chinese attacks on Google were
released, the Chinese government retaliated by launching a series of DDoS attacks on WikiLeak’s servers.74
Around the same time, armies of “zombie” computers in
Europe, Russia, and Asia flooded the WikiLeaks servers, sending massive data requests, forcing WikiLeaks to look for other
70 60 Minutes: Stuxnet (CBS television broadcast Mar. 4, 2012) (emphasis
added) (transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_16257390124/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare/).
71 Julian Assange and How He Sees the World, SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/64417045/Julian-Assange-andHow-He-Sees-the-World.
72 Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at
U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/
29/world/29cables.html.
73 Id. This was not the first time China was involved in cyber attacks. “In
late August 2011, a state television documentary appeared to capture an inprogress DDoS attack by the Chinese military on a Falun Gong website based
in Alabama. Not long after, the McAfee cyber security-company reported that
a state actor – widely believed to be China – had been engaged in a year-long
cyber attack program aimed at governments, U.S. corporations, and United
Nations groups.” Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 819 (2012).
74 Julian Assange and How He Sees the World, supra note 71.
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servers to help fight off the massive attack.75 Assange’s lawyer,
Mark Stephens, also claimed that a “state actor” was most likely behind some of these attacks.76 Even Senators and various
officials in Washington called for the United States and hackers to launch a full-scale attack on the whistleblowing organization.77
WikiLeaks continues to be hit by massive DDoS attacks,
making the site completely inaccessible for various periods.78
Although the identity of the attackers is unknown, Assange
remains steadfast in his assumption that that these attacks are
backed by many foreign governments, including the United
States.79 Assange has gone so far as to classify governmental
cyber attacks on WikiLeaks as “war crimes,” by declaring
“[a]ttacks on websites by governmental institutions however
are a war crime, same as assaults on every other civilian infrastructure.”80
III. NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
A. The Importance of Non-State Actors
In the past, principal actors in world politics and international relations were nation-states.81 However, in the years fol75 Ashlee Vance, WikiLeaks Struggles to Stay Online After Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 03, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/europe/04
domain.html.
76 Agence France-Presse, Assange Lawyer Blames ‘State Actor’ for Cyber
Attacks, THE RAW STORY (Dec. 03, 2010, 7:16 PM), http://www.rawstory.
com/rs/2010/12/03/assange-lawyer-blames-state-actor-cyberattacks/.
77 Declan McCullagh, Has WikiLeaks Landed in Cyberattack Crosshairs?,
CNET (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-2002083538.html.
78 WikiLeaks Site Comes Under Cyber Attack, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30,
2011, 10:18 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/31/wikileakssite-cyberattack-cable-release.
79 See McCullagh, supra note 77; WikiLeaks Says Website Was Target of
Cyber Attack, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
08/31/us-wikileaks-cyberattack-idUSTRE77U17920110831.
80 Julian Assange and How He Sees the World, supra note 71.
81 Muhittin Ataman, The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A
Challenge to Nation-States, 2 ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L RELATIONS
(2003), available at http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/
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lowing World War II, there has been a proliferation of nonstate actors (“i.e. organizations lacking formal or legal status as
a state or as an agent of a state”) in the international community that have become principal actors in world politics and international relations.82 The growth of non-state actors challenges and weakens the “state-centric” concept of international
politics and replaces it with a “transnational” system, where relationships and interactions are significantly more complex.83
This phenomenon has led scholars of international relations to
conclude that states are declining in importance, while nonstate actors are gaining great influence.84
Today, non-state actors play an important role in foreign
policy making and can pit one state against another.85 For example, terrorist organizations shape entire nations’ security
policies. Non-governmental organizations, like WikiLeaks and
spinoffs, open the eyes of the public to injustices, and can not
only destroy reputations, but can drastically shape policy and
international relations. Moreover, these non-state actors are
beginning to notice that cyber attacks can be a useful tool in
accomplishing their respective goals.
B. Cyber Attacks and Non-State Actors
It can be argued that non-state actors are involved in cyber
attacks almost daily. As previously mentioned, these attacks
can include alleged governmental attacks on non-state organizations, and can range from the everyday hacker targeting governmental websites, to sophisticated “cyber terrorists” launching massive DDoS attacks on private companies like Google.
Terrorist organizations have also been identified as having the
capability to launch destructive cyber attacks.
Recently, Al Qaeda has been building its cyber skills to attack Western nations.86 In 2006, it was reported that Al Qaeda
may have called for cyber attacks against U.S. financial instiataman2.htm.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Solce, supra note 13, at 299.
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tutions during December of that year.87 In April 2010, court
records from the case of terrorism suspect, Mohamedou Ould
Slahi, revealed that the organization initiated successful cyber
attacks, including one against government computers in Israel
in 2001.88 “This was the first public confirmation that the terrorist group has mounted an offensive cyber attack.”89 Slahi informed interrogators that Al Qaeda “used the Internet to
launch . . . computer attacks,” and that the organization “also
sabotaged other websites by launching denial of service attacks, such as one targeting the Israeli prime minister’s computer server.”90
Other international terrorist groups like the Armed Islamic Group, Aum Shinrikyo, Hezbollah, and Hamas have been
heightening their computer expertise as well.91 “Furthermore,
four domestic [U.S.] terrorist organizations – Hammerskin Nation, Stormfront, Aryan Nation, and National Alliance – are
recognized as potentially having the technology to engage in
cyber terrorism.”92 British authorities are also bracing for an
increase in cyber attacks as a result of Al Qaeda calling for a
cyber jihad following the death of Osama bin Laden.93
There will be more cyber terrorism. Groups will continue to benefit from the off-the-shelf technology in planning and conducting
attacks, making operations more secure and potentially more lethal. The Internet and virtual space will be strategically vital. 94

However, even though non-state actors are extremely important in international relations and have the capability to
launch destructive cyber attacks, attacks involving these parId.
Alex Kingsbury, Documents Reveal Al Qaeda Cyberattacks, U.S. NEWS
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/04/14/documentsreveal-al-qaeda-cyberattacks.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Solce, supra note 13, at 299.
92 Id.
93 Gerry Smith, UK Authorities Brace for ‘Cyber Jihad’ By Al Qeada after
Bin Laden Death, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 12, 2011, 1:17 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/12/al-qaeda-cyberjihad_n_895579.html.
94 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, CONTEST: THE UNITED
KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, 2011, Cm 8123, at 41
(U.K.).
87
88
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ties are not governed by current international laws.
By definition, terrorists who engage in the interstate use of force
do not observe the laws of war. Therefore, they are not entitled to
an elevated status that would grant them protections under jus
in bello. As such, members of terror groups are entitled to fewer
rights than protected persons and lawful combatants. 95

These existing rules have little to say, if anything at all, about
non-state actors that will most likely be at the center of these
future cyber conflicts.96
IV. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR AND
CYBER ATTACKS
The laws of war are split into two principle divisions: jus
ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum, or the “law to war,”
“governs the legality of resorting to armed force,”97 whereas jus
in bello means the “law in war.”98 For purposes of jus ad bellum, when analyzing whether an international conflict, cyber
or otherwise, is governed by the international laws of war, it
must be determined whether the attack violates the United
Nations Charter.99 In other words, does the attack constitute a
level of force that is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter?100 Or, does the attack rise to the level of an armed attack
justifying self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter?101
If the attack satisfies the principles of jus ad bellum, and can
be viewed as an armed attack under the U.N. Charter, then we
must look to laws governing the conduct of war. Such laws are
known as jus in bello laws, which are comprised of both Geneva
and Hague law.102
95 Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors
Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 334 (2003).
96 See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1093 (2007).
97 Swanson, supra note 3, at 312
98 Id.
99 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.
100See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 817, 841 (2012).
101 Id. at 845.
102 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2004) [hereinafter JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
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A. Jus ad Bellum
Legal regulation of the use of force in the international
community begins with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.103 The
provision states that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”104 However, the meaning of the “use of force” has
been debated ever since the Charter went into effect.105
Many view “use of force” to be interpreted in three possible
ways: force as armed violence, force as coercion, and force as interference.106 Advocates of the “force as armed violence view”
argue that “use of force” strictly applies to military attacks or
armed violence.107 This view mainly analyzes the instrument
used to inflict force, rather than its general effect.108 Under the
“force as coercion” interpretation, force is viewed in a more expansive way.109 Proponents of this interpretation view force as
including forms of pressure other than just armed force, i.e. political and economic coercion threatening state autonomy.110
The third approach, or “force as interference” approach, “ties
the concept of force to improper interference with the rights of
other states, focusing on the object and specific character of a
state’s actions rather than a narrow set of means or their coercive effect.”111 Weaker nation states and some scholars defend
the “force as coercion” and “force as interference” views.112
However, the general consensus, and the dominant view in the
international community, is that Article 2(4) prohibits only
physical armed force.113
ARMED CONFLICT].
103 Waxman, supra note 9, at 426.
104 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
105 Waxman, supra note 9, at 427-29.
106 Id. at 427-30.
107 Id. at 427-28.
108 Id. at 428.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 428-29.
111 Id. at 429.
112 See id. at 429-30.
113 Hathaway, supra note 100, at 842.

2013]

INT’L LAWS OF WAR AND CYBER ATTACKS

295

One exception to the blanket rule of Article 2(4) prohibiting
the threat or use of armed force is articulated in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. Article 51 stands for the proposition that nations can use force as a means of self-defense: “[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”114 Lawful self-defense is very difficult to define.115
However, the critical question in determining the lawfulness of
self-defense is whether or not an “armed attack” has actually
occurred.116
It is also widely understood that the definition of “armed
attack” is much narrower than the definition of “force” under
the U.N. Charter.117 For example, there may be acts that violate Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use or threat of force, but
do not constitute an “armed attack.” In Nicaragua v. The United States, the International Criminal Court (ICJ) found that
[A]n armed attack must be understood as including not merely
action by regular armed forces across an international border,
but also "the sending by . . . a State of armed bands . . . which
carry out acts of armed force against another State. . . .” The
Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of
armed bands to the territory of another State to the territory of
another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular
armed forces.118

According to the ICJ, armed attacks are those that constitute
the “most grave forms of the use of force.”119

U.N. Charter art. 51.
Hathaway, supra note 100, at 844.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) (emphasis added) (quoting Article 3,
paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX)).
119 Id. at 101.
114
115
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1. Application of Jus ad Bellum to Cyber Attacks
In order for the U.N. Charter to apply to cyber attacks, the
attacker must be a nation-state.120 If a situation existed where
a non-state actor (i.e. a terrorist organization) launched a cyber
attack against a state actor (and vice-versa), the Charter would
not apply. Since there are no specific provisions in the U.N.
Charter addressing cyber attacks, scholars have looked to
many approaches in interpreting the Charter in order to pinpoint when a cyber attack constitutes a use or threat of force,
or when they rise to the level of an armed attack.
Duncan Hollis utilizes three approaches in order to determine when a cyber attack constitutes a use or threat of force
under Article 2(4).121 However, according to Hollis, there are
major problems with each approach used in a modern context.122 The first approach is the traditionalist “instrumentality” approach, which argues that a cyber attack cannot constitute an “armed attack” under Article 2(4) because it lacks the
physical characteristics traditionally associated with a military
attack.123 According to Hollis, the text of the U.N. Charter offers some support for this view in Article 41, which “lists
‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ to include ‘complete or partial interruption of . . . telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication.”124 Since the object of most cyber attacks is to interrupt or disrupt some means of communication
(i.e. a massive DDoS attack aimed at a website in order to stop
it from displaying information), “more or different forms of aggression must be shown in order [for the cyber attack] to constitute an ‘armed attack’ under the U.N. charter.”125
The second approach, the “target-based” approach,126 suggests that cyber attacks constitute a use of force or an armed
attack whenever the attack “penetrates ‘critical national infrastructure’ systems, even absent significant destruction or casu-

See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; art. 51.
Hollis, supra note 96, at 1041.
122 Id. at 1041-42.
123 Id. at 1041.
124 Id.
125 Stevens, supra note 20, at 675.
126 Hollis, supra note 96, at 1041.
120
121
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alties.”127 Hollis argues that this approach tends to be too overinclusive, since cyber attacks can produce wide-ranging effects,
from merely informational (distributing propaganda), to inconvenient (disrupting systems temporarily via a denial-of-service
attack), to potentially dangerous (implanting a logic bomb doing no immediate harm, but with the potential to cause future
injury), to immediately destructive (disabling a system permanently via a virus).128
The third and final approach, the “consequentiality” approach, focuses on the consequences of the cyber attack.129
Whenever the cyber attack intends to cause effects normally
produced by kinetic force (death and destruction of property),
the attack constitutes a use of force, and an armed attack.130
Sharon Stevens argues that the real problem with the “consequentiality” approach is that it does not account for the damage
a cyber attack can inflict even with a lack of physical effects:
A cyber attack that shuts down any part of a nation’s critical infrastructure may have an effect that is much more debilitating
than a traditional military attack. The threat in such a situation
may be more terrorizing and harmful than a traditional armed
attack. Certainly, a country that is unable to use its banking system, or whose power grid has gone off-line due to a cyber attack,
possesses legitimate claims for reparation, justice, and security.
Because the consequentiality approach focuses on the same type
of physical damage caused by a kinetic attack, it does not sufficiently protect critical infrastructure.131

But, given these possible approaches, is it possible that the
current law of jus ad bellum could apply to the recent cyber attacks mentioned in Part II of this article?
3. Current Jus ad Bellum Laws are Inadequate in Regulating
Recent Cyber Attacks
Since cyber attacks lack the physical characteristics of a
traditional military attack, the “instrumentality” approach would not
Id.
Id. at 1042.
129 Id. at 1041.
130 Id.
131 Stevens, supra note 20, at 676.
127
128
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apply to the cyber attacks on Estonia’s infrastructure, the RussiaGeorgian conflict, the Stuxnet worm, the alleged governmental attacks
on WikiLeaks, the Chinese cyber attacks, and cyber attacks involving
terrorists. As a result, these attacks would not constitute force or an
armed attack under the U.N. Charter.
With regards to the “target-based” approach, it may be
possible that current jus ad bellum laws apply to the Estonian
cyber attacks, but not the Russian-Georgian conflict, or the
Stuxnet worm. As previously stated, Estonia’s infrastructure
was under a massive DDoS attack in 2007. Fire services, hospitals, newspapers, and banks were all victims of the attack. It
can be argued that Estonia’s critical infrastructure was attacked, and under the “target-based” approach, this attack
could be seen as a use or threat of force, or an armed attack.
However, since the attack caused mere confusion and unrest
rather than any direct deaths or destruction of property, is it
reasonable that these cyber attacks be labeled as a use of force
or an armed attack under the U.N. Charter? The current laws
of force and armed attack do not specify or answer this question.
In applying the “target-based” approach to the RussiaGeorgian cyber attack and the Stuxnet worm, one needs to examine what constitutes “critical national infrastructure,” since
it is unclear whether government websites actually constitute
“critical national infrastructure.” One could argue that government websites that affect a nation’s ability to communicate
are part of its “critical national infrastructure.” However, the
current law does not incorporate this definition. Also, what
about cyber attacks against nuclear facilities, as in the case of
the Stuxnet worm? Do these facilities constitute “critical national infrastructure” under Hollis’s “target-based” approach?
Again, one can only speculate.
In all of the cyber attacks mentioned, with the exception of
the Estonian situation, there were no civilian casualties.
Nonetheless, in all of these cases, it can be argued that there
was a destruction of property. In the case of the Stuxnet worm,
parts of nuclear centrifuges in Iran were destroyed. Regarding
Estonia, Russia, and the WikiLeaks DDoS attacks, it can be inferred that massive amounts of data were likely destroyed as a
result of the cyber attacks. However, it is unlikely that this
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type of property destruction would amount to a use of force or
an armed attack under a formalist analysis of the U.N. Charter, given the fact that the Charter was written decades ago.
As a result, it is unlikely that the “consequences” approach
would apply to any of the cyber cases cited.
Lastly, since cyber attacks involving WikiLeaks and terrorists involve non-state actors, current jus ad bellum laws would
not apply in these situations, no matter what approach is used
or how much damage is inflicted. However, “in today’s world,
non-state actors may inflict damages tantamount to a statesponsored military attack. Non-state aggressors may also gain
sophisticated technological skills that parallel the type of attack that Estonia faced in 2007.”132
It is clear to see that the current jus ad bellum laws accomplish little in categorizing recent cyber attacks as a use or
threat of force or an armed attack. However, the cases mentioned demonstrate major flaws in current jus ad bellum laws,
and demonstrate that current laws must adapt to this new
style of combat.
B. Jus in Bello (International Humanitarian Law)
As previously stated, jus in bello or “law in war,” also
known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC), is a set of rules that seek to limit the
effects of armed conflicts.133 IHL also “protects persons who are
not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts
the means and methods of warfare.”134
IHL is comprised of both Geneva and Hague law.135 Geneva law refers to the laws created in the Geneva Conventions.136
A major part of IHL is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,137 which nearly every nation-State in the world

Stevens, supra note 20, at 676.
What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS, (July 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_
ihl.pdf.
134 Id. (emphasis added).
135 Swanson, supra note 3, at 312.
136 Id.
137 Id.
132

133
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has agreed to be bound by.138 The Conventions have been further developed and supplemented by two agreements know as
the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, which relate to the
protection of victims of armed conflicts.139 “These treaties are
particularly concerned with the protection of the victims of
armed conflict, with Additional Protocol I focusing on the
means and methods of warfare.”140 Conversely, Hague law refers to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and is mainly
concerned with the methods and means of warfare, tactics and
the general conduct of hostilities.141
In order for IHL to govern a cyber attack, the attack must
constitute an “armed conflict.”142 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), there are only two types
of armed conflicts under IHL: “[i]nternational armed conflicts,
opposing two or more States, and non-international armed conflicts between governmental forces and non-governmental
armed groups, or between such groups only.”143 Regarding international armed conflicts (IAC), Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides that:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation

Id.
See id.; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
140 Swanson, supra note 3, at 312; see Additional Protocol II, supra note
139, art. 1.
141 Swanson, supra note 3, at 313; see Convention With Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803;
Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague
II), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
142 JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note
102.
143 Id.
138

139
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meets with no armed resistance.144

Additional Protocol I also relies on this same “armed conflict”
language. Article 1(3) of Additional Protocol I states “this Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.”145
In the words of the Conventions, “High Contracting Parties”
are nation-States.146 The Commentary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 also states:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a
state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or
how much slaughter takes place.147

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic further defined an
IAC by holding that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is
a resort to armed force between States.”148
In defining non-international armed conflicts, it is appropriate to consult Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions
and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol II.149 Additionally, the
ICTY determined the existence of a non-international armed
conflict “whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups
or between such groups within a State.”150 The court further
confirmed that NIAC’s exist in situations where “several factors [confront] each other without involvement of the government’s armed forces.”151 Since the ruling in Tadic, each judgment of the ICTY has taken this definition as a starting
144

Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick, supra note 8, art. 2.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 139, art. 1, para. 3.
146 How is the Term ‘Armed Conflict Defined in International Humanitarian Law? INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 1 (Mar. 2008),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf
[hereinafter ICRC Opinion Paper].
147 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick, supra note 8, art. 2.
148 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Opinion and Judgment, ¶
561 (May 7, 1997).
149 ICRC Opinion Paper, supra note 146, at 3.
150 Tadic, IT-94-1-A , ¶ 561.
151 ICRC Opinion Paper, supra note 146, at 4.
145
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1. Application of Current IHL to Cyber Attacks
Assuming a cyber attack does meet the definition of force
and armed attack under the U.N. Charter, the next step in the
analysis would be to determine if the attack is governed by current jus in bello principles or International Humanitarian Law
(IHL). As previously stated, in order for IHL to govern a cyber
attack, an armed conflict must exist. Some have argued that
IHL cannot govern cyber attacks because there is nothing
physical or kinetic about these operations.153 Under this theory, a cyber attack is not an armed conflict because it does not
embody traditional aspects of military attacks; therefore, cyber
attacks are beyond the scope of current IHL.
However, commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols have implied that “armed conflict” can
be viewed in an expansive way.154 “[S]ome degree of intensity
and duration must be considered, as underlying principles of
IHL make clear.”155 IHL contained in Hague Law and the Geneva Conventions is based on the idea that victims of an armed
conflict are entitled to protection.156 This protection is usually
framed in terms of injury, death, or property damage or destruction.157 “Therefore, fundamental principles of IHL provide
that armed conflict occurs when a group takes measures that
injure, kill, damage, or destroy.”158
As a result, a cyber attack could constitute an armed conflict, as long as certain consequences result from the attack.
Moreover, the language of Additional Protocol I indicates that
the drafters anticipated change, and that Geneva law would
Id.
Swanson, supra note 3, at 314; see Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 365, 368-69 (2003) (describing the arguments against the applicability
of IHL to computer network attacks).
154 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2004).
155 Swanson, supra note 3, at 314.
156 Id.
157 Id. (quoting Schmitt, supra note 153, at 366).
158 Id.
152

153
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have to apply to new methods of warfare.159 Article 36 of Additional Protocol I requires that:
In the study, development, acquisition, or adoption of a new
weapon, means or methods of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party.160

IHL can also be viewed as anticipating technological change.161
The “Martens Clause” in the Preamble to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 provides:
[E]ven in cases not explicitly covered by specific agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of principles of international law derived from established custom, principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public
conscience.”162

In other words, attacks should essentially be judged largely by
their effects, rather than by how they are employed.163
When applying IHL to cyber attacks, the attack must follow some guidelines. For instance, the attack must not produce
“unnecessary suffering.”164 Article 35 of Additional Protocol I
thus serves to place some limits on the range of means and
weapons that are available in today’s modern society. The attack must also follow the principle of proportionality as stated
in Additional Protocol I, which requires that the losses resulting from the attack should not be excessive in relation to the
expected military advantage.165 “These principles are important to cyber [attacks] because they require that the attacker refrain from attacks that may be expected to cause excessive
collateral damage.”166
159 Knut Dormann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer
Network Attacks, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Nov. 19, 2004),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf.
160 Additional Protocol I, supra note 139, art. 36.
161 Swanson, supra note 3, at 315.
162 Id. (quoting LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1998)).
163 Id.
164 Additional Protocol I, supra note 139, art. 35.
165 Id., art. 51, para. 5(b)
166 Swanson, supra note 3, at 316.
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Where armed conflict exists, IHL governs once kinetic
weapons are used in combination with cyber attacks.167 However, the law is unclear when cyber attacks are the first or only
hostile attacks in the conflict. Yet, it is agreed that in this situation, the key to assessing the attack is in analyzing the effects or consequences of the attack.168 “Based on this framework, IHL applies whenever cyber attacks, attributed to a state
are more than simply sporadic in nature and are intended to,
and actually do, cause injury, death, damage, or destruction or
such consequences are foreseeable.”169 Therefore, IHL most
likely would not apply to cyber attacks where the actual, foreseeable, or intended consequences do not include injury, death,
damage, or destruction.170 However, a lone cyber attack might
fall under current IHL if these consequences would result.171
2. Current IHL is Inadequate in Regulating Recent Cyber
Attacks
In applying current IHL to recent cyber attacks - i.e. the
attacks on Estonia’s infrastructure, the Russian-Georgian conflict, the
Stuxnet worm, the alleged governmental attacks on WikiLeaks, and Chinese cyber attacks - one may conclude that these conflicts did not result
in the kinds of consequences necessary to rise to the level of an armed
conflict under current IHL. During the cyber conflict between Russia
and Georgia, major servers were brought down, resulting in confusion
throughout the country and hindering certain communications. In Estonia, the nation’s infrastructure was hit, affecting many key societal components. The same could be said for the WikiLeaks attacks and the
Stuxnet worm. An argument could be made that damage or destruction
was done to property in these situations, even if death or injury were not
present. Yet, since it appears that the main results of these cyber attacks
were confusion, inconvenience, and possible data destruction, IHL would
not govern these situations.
Nevertheless, while the cyber attacks resulting in the
types of consequences discussed above were implemented by
Dormann, supra note 159.
Swanson, supra note 3, at 316.
169 Id. at 317.
170 Id.
171 Id.
167
168
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non-state actors, which are not covered by current IHL, they do
pose serious problems, and can be potentially harmful in many
indirect ways. Consider the outcomes if the governmental attacks on WikiLeaks or the Chinese cyber attacks caused massive data destruction or massive property destruction to computers or servers; or if Al Qaeda launched a massive cyber
attack against the United States military or the United States
infrastructure, causing a major dam to be destroyed, resulting
in widespread flooding. Or, suppose a third party was behind
the Stuxnet worm, or the Estonia or Russian-Georgian conflict.
Assuming these cyber attacks did produce the necessary consequences to make IHL applicable, IHL still would not apply because it only applies to states or “High Contracting Parties.”
Though, as non-state actors have the potential to cause massive destruction via a cyber attack, the laws must address
them.
V. IMPROVING CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. International Laws vs. Domestic Criminal Laws
Before discussing ways in which to expand or amend current international laws to include cyber attacks between state
and non-state actors, it must be determined whether international laws are in fact the most effective tool in regulating
cyber attacks between state and non-state actors. Perhaps
separate domestic laws might better serve this purpose? Although some may believe domestic laws are the best means to
address the cyber attack issue, given the nature of cyber attacks, the confusion and lack of clarity created by conflicting
domestic laws and policies, and the global trend of nations coming together to form multilateral agreements regarding similar
areas of cyberspace, utilizing international laws seems to be
the best solution.
Cyber attacks are global in nature.172 Changes in domestic
law and policy criminalizing cyber attacks, while valuable legal
responses, cannot adequately and effectively curb an action
that is truly an international concept.173 Cyber attacks occur in
172
173

Hathaway, supra note 100, at 880.
Id.
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cyberspace, and “cyberspace is a network of networks that includes thousands of Internet service providers across the globe:
no single state or organization can maintain effective cyber defenses on its own.”174 “An effective solution to this global challenge cannot be achieved by individual states acting alone. It
will require global cooperation.”175
International laws further establish uniformity and clarity
where numerous domestic laws may not. Many countries, including the United States and China, have recognized the serious threat posed by cyber attacks.176 In 2011, the Department
of Defense established “five strategic initiatives” to cyber security.177 The Pentagon further stated that a cyber attack by a
foreign state could be considered a traditional act of war, in
that “any computer attack that threatens widespread civilian
casualties – for example, by cutting off power supplies or bringing down hospitals and emergency-responder networks – could
be treated as an act of aggression.”178 However, the Pentagon’s
policy fails to mention how the United States might respond to
a cyber attack from a non-state actor,179 “nor does it establish a
threshold for what level of cyber attack merits a military response.”180
China, on the other hand, seems to take a more expansive
approach to cyber attacks. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security cooperation group headed by China and RusId.
Id. at 822.
176 See id.
177 DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE (2011)
[hereinafter STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE], available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf (describing the initiatives:
1. Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip, so
that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential; 2. Employ new
defense operating concepts to protect DoD network and systems; 3. Partner
with other U.S. government departments and agencies in the private sector
to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy; 4. Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective
cybersecurity; 5. Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional
cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation).
178 David E. Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/06/01/us/politics/01cyber.html.
179 Id.
180 Id.
174
175
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sia, adopted more of a means-based approach to cyber attacks.181 The agreement between the parties cites and defines
an “information war” (basically a “cyber war”) as “mass psychologic [sic] brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as to
force the state to take decisions in the interest of an opposing
party.”182 The agreement further states that the “dissemination of information harmful to the spiritual, moral, and cultural
spheres of other states” should be viewed as a “security
threat.”183
These policies initiated by the United States and China
obviously lack clarity and uniformity. An attack initiated
against China may not be considered a cyber attack under
United States policies, but may be deemed one under Chinese
cyber attack principles. A singular cyber attack definition under international law, such as the U.N. Charter, can accomplish uniformity as well as clarity, and therefore makes international law the more effective tool for regulating cyber
attacks.
In recent years, there has been somewhat of a trend towards countries signing multilateral agreements in order to establish uniform laws regarding cyberspace and cyber crimes.
One such agreement, besides the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is the Convention on Cybercrime. The Convention was
adopted in 2001 by the Council of Europe.184 Since its adoption,
forty-three countries have signed the treaty, but only sixteen
have ratified it.185 The Convention’s main objective is to pursue
a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society
against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international cooperation.186 In other words,
the basic purpose of the Convention was to create a vehicle that
Hathaway, supra note 100, at 865.
Agreement Between the Governments of the Member States of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, Annex I, at 209 (Dec. 2, 2008) [hereinafter
Shanghai Cooperation Agreement].
183 Id. at 203.
184 Stevens, supra note 20, at 685.
185 Id.
186 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, pmbl, Nov. 23, 2001,
C.E.T.S. No. 185 [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention], available at http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm
181
182
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would facilitate the creation of uniform domestic laws relating
to Internet crime.187
The interest in harmonizing cyber laws stemmed from the chaotic and impossible dilemma presented to anyone intending to do
international business via the Internet. The web of varied and
conflicting criminal sanctions was overwhelming and burdensome. Not only was it difficult to understand what law applied to
a given situation, but even if one could manage that feat, in order
to act lawfully, that actor would have to sink to the lowest common denominator, i.e., to follow the most restrictive law in the
world. This situation was unfair and too restrictive on the Internet itself.188

In creating the Convention, the drafters understood that the
only way to effectively regulate cyberspace is through a multilateral set of uniform laws.189 The drafters recognized it was
simply too difficult to accomplish this goal any other way.190
B. Amendments and Expansion Suggestions
1. Inclusion of Non-State Actors
First, and arguably most importantly, international laws
like the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions must be
amended to include conflicts involving non-state actors. Although non-state actors are not traditionally subject to jus ad
bellum and jus in bello principles, the current international legal construct needs to evolve in order to include these principle
actors.191 In regards to the U.N. Charter, Norman Printer describes two reasons why non-state actors should not escape the
Charter’s provisions:
First, an entity that elects to use force on the international plane
should be treated as an international actor and should be bound
by accepted international norms . . . . Second, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Charter to allow terrorist groups
that engage in transnational armed conflict against a state to fall

Stevens, supra note 20, at 686.
Id.
189 See generally Cybercrime Convention, supra note 186.
190 Id.
191 Printer, supra note 95, at 334.
187
188
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outside the Charter.192

In order for non-state actors to be covered under these
laws, they would need to be granted some sort of international
legal status.193 Printer suggests that although non-state actors
do not typically enjoy international legal status, actors like
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly become recognized as subjects of international law “with some incidents of international legal status.”194 Printer further argues,
“a terrorist network that operates on a global basis, insofar as
it is an association of persons with a common purpose not affiliated with a state, arguably attributes similar to an NGO.”195
Yet, Printer suggests that terrorist groups should not enjoy the
same legitimacy as an NGO.196 Instead, terrorist groups should
receive a limited form of international legal status, focusing on
the rights of states in the international community to hold such
organizations accountable for violations of international laws of
force.197
In addition, if the principles of jus ad bellum outlined in
the U.N. Charter were applied to non-state actors, the purpose
of the Charter to maintain international peace and security
would be furthered.198 Conversely, the Charter’s principles
would be ill-served if the activities of rogue groups fell outside
the principles of jus ad bellum, since non-state actors such as
terrorist organizations have the capacity to greatly threaten international peace and security.199
A similar argument can be made that jus in bello principles, outlined in the Geneva Conventions, should apply to nonstate actors. Since the purpose of the Conventions and its Additional Protocols is to limit the effects of armed conflicts and
conduct of actors within these armed conflicts, the principles of
jus in bello would be ill-served if non-state actors were not included, as their conduct would not be limited in any way. FurId. at 345.
Id. at 348.
194 Id. at 347.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 348.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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thermore, conduct of state actors involved in conflicts with nonstate actors would be murky and unclear.
2. A Clear Cyber Attack Definition
As previously stated, currently a cyber attack can be defined in many ways. Accordingly, a specific, codified definition is
needed. A singular definition would provide clarity on whether a state or
non-state actor is initiating an armed conflict and whether retaliation in
self-defense is warranted.200 Specific codification of international criminal provisions for cyber attacks also creates greater deterrence because
actors know what is specifically forbidden.201 The legitimacy gained by
cyber attack codification increases cyber attack law’s deterrence value
since actors are more likely to follow rules and regulations that carry the
authority of legitimacy.202 As a result, the U.N. Charter should be
amended to include a clear and comprehensive definition of cyber attacks.
Davis Brown proposed a singular definition of a cyber attack – calling it an information attack - in his “Draft Convention Regulating the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict”:
The term “information attack” means the use of computer and/or
other information or communications systems to destroy, alter, or
manipulate data or images, engage in denial of service attacks,
transmit malicious code, or perpetrate similar attacks, or do
physical damage to any target for the purpose of inflicting injury
or degrading the enemy’s ability or will to fight. 203

Brown’s definition is a good starting point. However, the proposed amendment should define the various types of cyber attacks, while at the same time should be broad enough to incorporate the idea that new methods of cyber attacks are likely to
be discovered.

Hathaway, supra note 100, at 881-82.
Stevens, supra note 20, at 704.
202 Id. 704-05.
203 Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate
the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179,
215 (2006).
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3. Cyber Attacks as a Use of Force
Since the general consensus in the international community is that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits only physical
armed force,204 the U.N. Charter must be changed to clearly indicate
when a cyber attack would be a use of force. In expanding the U.N.
Charter, cyber attacks should be considered an act of force by a state or a
non-state actor based on a “consequentiality” approach described in Part
IV of this article, regardless of the instrumentality used or the type of actor.205 This definition would further include damage that cyber attacks
can inflict, even with a lack of physical effects. A recent publication
from the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, agrees that
the consequences of a cyber attack are extremely important:
If a coordinated computer network attack shuts down a nation’s
air traffic control system along with its banking and financial
systems and public utilities, and opens the floodgates of several
dams resulting in general flooding that causes widespread civilian deaths and property damage, it may well be that no one
would challenge the victim nation if it concluded that it was a
victim of an armed attack, or of an act equivalent to an armed attack.206

So, if there is a certain level of death and property destruction
caused by the cyber attack, this attack should be viewed as an
act of force under the U.N. Charter. Regarding property destruction, the threshold should ultimately include the type of
traditional physical destruction produced by kinetic force
(building collapse, bomb detonations, destruction caused by
flooding, etc.), as well as some substantial threshold level of data destruction, to ensure attacks that target and affect a nation’s infrastructure (i.e. banking systems, emergency response, and power grids) are covered.
This “consequentiality” approach should also address the
type of cyber attacks that lack traditional physical effects. For
instance, the U.N. Charter definition of force should include
cyber attacks whose consequences are economic and political,
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.1.
206 DEP’T. OF DEFENSE, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 18 (1999).
204
205
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instead of applying only in situations where there are foreseeable or intended consequences from the attacks including injury,
death, damage, and destruction.207 Sharon Stevens argues
“cyber attacks which result in economic losses or inconvenience
to civilians . . . could be used by an enemy country to target certain ethnic groups, gain economic advantage in international
trade, or influence international exchange rates.”208 These
types of attacks could cause massive destruction, albeit not
physical. As a result, attacks similar to the DDoS attacks that
briefly shut down Estonia’s infrastructure in 2007, as well as
those relating to the Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, could
arguably fall within this category. Furthermore, these types of
attacks can be potentially more debilitating than a traditional
military attack. Given these guidelines, a cyber attack that only affected free speech would not be included in this definition
of force, nor would an attack that only destroyed a small network of electronic data. Consequently, cyber attacks like the
Stuxnet worm, which caused minimal property and data destruction, would probably not fall under this proposed expanded definition of the use of force. Lastly, cyber attacks that
simply cause confusion among the populace, or amongst the
non-state actors’ members, would not specifically be covered by
the Charter as an act of force. This expanded definition of force
would apply equally to state and non-state actors.
Targets should also be more clearly defined. For instance,
instead of utilizing the term “critical national infrastructure,”
perhaps the Charter should include a definition of the term
“critical infrastructure” so as to ensure that non-state actors
are covered, since their infrastructure is not in a sense “national.” The definition should include power grids, banking systems, water supply systems, nuclear facilities, etc. Attacks
against critical infrastructure would thus be an act of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter if certain consequences occurred. The term “critical infrastructure” should not only mean
the actual physical infrastructure, but also websites or computer systems of these agencies or non-state actors, so as to ensure
that potentially vulnerable computer networks are protected.

207
208
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4. Cyber Attacks in IHL
Since IHL can only govern attacks that rise to the level of
an armed conflict as defined in the Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols, and since it is questionable whether cyber
attacks can ever be governed by existing IHL principles, the
definition of armed conflict under IHL needs to be expanded to
include cyber attacks involving state and non-state actors.
Since the law of armed conflict outlined in IHL mainly focuses
on the effects of an armed attack or use of force, or when an attack causes “injury, death, damage, or destruction, or when
such consequences are foreseeable,”209 the definition of armed
conflict should be expanded to include cyber attacks between
states and non-states that exhibit these type of consequences,
as well as political and economic consequences previously discussed. The definition should further include cyber attacks
that result in massive property and data destruction in order to
include attacks on a nation’s central infrastructure. In sum,
IHL regarding cyber attacks should give substantial consideration to non-lethal consequences.
IHL should also be expanded to specifically address cyber
attacks against non-military objectives which would foreseeably cause non-traditional results. Specifically, Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I provides:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.210

Based on the language of Article 48, IHL would prohibit cyber
attacks directed against non-military objectives that are intended to, or would foreseeably, cause injury, death, destruction, or damage.211 However, an attack aimed against a nonmilitary objective that is not likely to result in these consequences would be permissible.212 Therefore, an attack involvSwanson, supra note 3, at 316.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 139, art. 48.
211 Swanson, supra note 3, at 317.
212 Id.
209
210
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ing a cyber attack on a nation’s power grid, banking or trading
systems, or other aspects of infrastructure such as the DDoS
attacks involved in the Estonia and Russian-Georgian conflicts
would not be covered. Nor would a virus initiated by a nonstate actor aimed at these locations be covered. However, as
noted earlier, these types of cyber attacks against non-military
targets could have non-traditional destructive consequences213
and should be accounted for in current IHL.
The IHL principles regarding cyber attacks must also address proportionality and unnecessary suffering outlined in
Part IV.214 However, regarding proportionality, under current
IHL, specifically Article 51(5)(b)215 of Additional Protocol I:
It is difficult to evaluate whether an attack would be proportional
according to the relevant categories of “loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,”
as the typical direct effects of cyber attacks may be non-lethal or
temporary, yet severe.216

Consequently, the current language of proportionality needs to
be changed in order to expressly give more weight to temporary
or non-lethal consequences.217 For instance, regarding countermeasures, if the United States were attacked by a virus that
destroyed massive amounts of data, it would only be able to respond with a similar cyber attack that would cause a proportional amount of destruction; nothing more. This proportionality would also apply if a non-state actor was attacked by a state
actor in a similar fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current international laws of war are inadequate, as they
do not define or regulate many instances of cyber attacks.
See supra Part II.C.1-2.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
215 “Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate . . . an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 139, art. 51,
para. 5(b).
216 Hathaway, supra note 100, at 851.
217 See id.
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They must be changed to include cyber attacks involving state
and non-state actors. A new frontier is before us. Gone is the
day when nation-states dominated international relations.
Gone is the day when kinetic warfare was the only way to
cause massive destruction. Cyberspace is the new battlefield,
state and non-state entities are the soldiers, and the weapons
are computer-generated. “The very technologies that empower
us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt
and destroy.”218 Cyber attacks and cyber warfare are here to
stay, and if the international community does not regulate this
new style of combat, the consequences could be unfathomable.
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STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 177, at 2.

